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THE ‘PIERRE DUHEM THESIS.’ 
A REAPPRAISAL OF DUHEM’S DISCOVERY 
OF THE PHYSICS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 
Horia-Roman PATAPIEVICI 
ABSTRACT: Pierre Duhem is the discoverer of the physics of the Middle Ages. The 
discovery that there existed a physics of the Middle Ages was a surprise primarily for 
Duhem himself. This discovery completely changed the way he saw the evolution of 
physics, bringing him to formulate a complex argument for the growth and continuity of 
scientific knowledge, which I call the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ (not to be confused either 
with what Roger Ariew called the ‘true Duhem thesis’ as opposed to the Quine-Duhem 
thesis, which he persuasively argued is not Duhem’s, or with the famous ‘Quine-Duhem 
Thesis’ itself). The ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ consists of five sub-theses (some 
transcendental in nature, some other causal, factual, or descriptive), which are not 
independent, as they do not work separately (but only as a system) and do not relate to 
reality separately (but only simultaneously). The famous and disputed ‘continuity thesis’ 
is part, as a sub-thesis, from this larger argument. I argue that the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ 
wraps up all of Duhem’s discoveries in the history of science and as a whole represents 
his main contribution to the historiography of science. The ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ is the 
central argument of Pierre Duhem's work as historian of science. 
KEYWORDS: Pierre Duhem, physics of the Middle Ages, scientific 
knowledge, history of science 
1. 
The discoverer of the physics of the Middle Ages was Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) – 
physicist, philosopher, and historian of science.1 Since this wondrous episode is 
rarely mentioned, and the importance of the physics of the Middle Ages to the 
                                                                
1 Stanley L. Jaki, Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work of Pierre Duhem (The Hague/Boston/ 
Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984); Stanley L. Jaki, Pierre Duhem. Homme de science 
et de foi, trans. François Raymondaud (Paris: Beauchesne, 1990); Stanley L. Jaki, “Science and 
Censorship: Hélène Duhem and the Publication of the ‘Système du Monde,’” The Intercollegiate 
Review (Winter 1985-86): 41-49, reprinted in Stanley L. Jaki, The Absolute beneath the 
Relative and Other Essays (New York: University Press of America, 1988), 173-187. For a 
critical assessment of Duhem's discoveries regarding the physics of the Middle Ages, see John E. 
Murdoch, “Pierre Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science and Philosophy in the Latin 
West,” in Gli studi di filosofia medievale fra otto e novecento. Contributo a un bilancio 
storiografico. Atti del convegno internazionale Roma, 21-23 settembre 1989, eds. Ruedi Imbach 
and Alfonso Maierù (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1991), 255-302.  
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birth of modern science of nature is frequently denied, often ignored, and almost 
always disregarded, I will first try to sketch briefly the history of this discovery. 
That the Middle Ages was a scientifically fertile era was a fact nobody 
remembered anymore at the beginning of the 20th century. On the contrary, all 
the authoritative people were anchored in the belief that, in what regarded 
physics, between Archimedes and Galileo there had passed 18 centuries of 
darkness. This ‘knowledge’ (actually, a pre-judgment) had imperceptibly become 
opinio communis throughout the cultivated Europe. But, considered in its origin, 
this ‘consensus of authorities’ was merely the consequence imposed by the 
Renaissance position. The Renaissance humanists did not see in the logicism and 
mathematicism of the great doctors of scholasticism anything else than the 
corruption of Latin. The division of history into three eras (Antiquity, Middle 
Ages and the Modern Times) dates from the early Renaissance. This division was 
made to mark the distance of those claiming it from what immediately preceded 
them, as well as their adherence to the distant past. According to these value 
judgments, classical antiquity was associated with bright light, the period that 
followed it became the ‘Dark Ages,’ and the age of those who invented this 
temporal tripartition was presented as an  exit out of the night, an awakening, a 
Renaissance.2 An example is Pierre de la Ramée who, in the first three books of his 
work Scholarum mathematicarum libri unus et triginta (1596), presents a detailed 
account of the development of mathematics in which medieval contributions are 
completely absent. Was that because there have not existed any? We know well 
today that they existed. Medieval contributions were absent because they had to 
be ignored: the logic of the tripartite scheme demanded that. Therefore, from the 
Greek antiquity, Pierre de la Ramée passes directly to the time when, according to 
him, there took place the ‘rebirth of sciences.3  
With his incomparable propagandistic and polemic genius, Voltaire 
imposed the preconception that traditional Christian institutions exerted a major 
obscurantist influence on human progress,4 while William Whewell, with the 
                                                                
2 On this division, see Matei Călinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-garde, 
Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 19-22.  
3 Matthias Schramm, “Steps Towards the Idea of Function: A Comparison between Eastern and 
Western Science of the Middle Ages: Augustine to Galileo,” History of Science 4 (1965): 70. For 
a nuanced discussion of this statement, regarding the contributions to optics which Pierre de la 
Ramée has himself recommended for publication (the Latin version of Ibn al-Haytham's Optics 
and the compilation of Witelo), see Schramm, “Steps Towards the Idea of Function,” 97-98 (note 
5). 
4 David S. Lux, “Societies, Circles, Academies, and Organizations: A Historiographic Essay on 
Seventeenth-Century Science,” in Revolution and Continuity: Essays in the History and 
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authority of the expert, denied the possibility of any form of science in the ‘Dark 
Ages’ dominated by the Church, arguing that all the speculations of medieval 
scholars regarding nature were confused and based on fictitious notions, that 
natural science is an invention of the 17th century, and its only antecedents can 
be identified in Antiquity.5 In 1788, with the supreme authority given by the most 
important treatise of mechanics of the century – Mécanique Analytique –, the 
great Lagrange asserted that between Archimedes and Galileo science has 
experienced eighteen centuries of darkness: “l’intervalle qui a séparé ces deux 
grands génies disparaît dans l’histoire de la Mécanique.”6 
Five years later, the Marquis de Condorcet confirmed the verdict of the 
eighteen centuries, and even added them two more. For the revolutionary 
Condorcet, who wrote Esquisse d’un tableau des progrès de l’esprit humain fleeing 
from Jacobin authorities who sought to arrest him, „the triumph of Christianity 
marked the entrance into a complete decay of philosophy and sciences,” so that 
between Plato and the 17th century there have passed twenty centuries of 
„complete unfruitfulness” for the advancement of science: 
Le matelot, qu’une exacte observation de la longitude préserve du naufrage, doit 
sa vie à une théorie qui, par une chaîne de vérités, remonte à des découvertes 
faites dans l’école de Platon, et ensevelis pendant vingt siècles dans une entière 
inutilité.7 
2. 
This was also Duhem's opinion until 1903. As a historian of science, Duhem 
wholeheartedly embraced the idea (taken in his specialty, apart from Lagrange, 
also from Dühring8 and Mach9) that the medieval period was scientifically sterile 
and that, therefore, between the science of the Greeks (such as it was) and the 
                                                                                                                                       
Philosophy of Early Modern Science, eds. Peter Barker and Roger Ariew (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press. 1991), 25 (note 6).  
5 William Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences from the earliest to the Present Times, 
vol. 1 (London: John W. Parker; Cambridge: J. and J.J. Deighton, 1837), 235-236. 
6 J.-L. Lagrange, Mécanique analytique, tome II, 3e éd., ed. M. J. Bertrand (Paris: Mallet-
Bachelier, Gendre et Successeur de Bachelier, 1853), 243 
7 Marquis de Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau des progrès de l’esprit humain [first published in 
1795], in Les sciences historiques de l’antiquité à nos jours, eds. Charles-Olivier Carbonell and 
Jean Walch (Paris: Larousse, 1994), 107.. 
8 Eugen Dühring, Kritische Geschichte der allgemeinen Principien der Mechanik (Berlin: 
Theobald Grieben, 1873). 
9 Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestellt (Leipzig: F.A. 
Brockhaus, 1883).  
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17th century (when modern science was born, almost ex nihilo) we are dealing 
with a profound discontinuity.10 For example, in his first article on the history of 
physics, “Les Théories de l’Optique” (1894), Duhem states plainly that the birth of 
the discipline he is studying takes place in the 17th century, with Descartes as a 
source of the optical theories.11 His argument runs as it follows: except for 
astronomy, hydrostatics and the general principles of statics, the history of natural 
science in Antiquity and the Middle Ages only gives us „inconsistent or poorly 
observed facts;” and the truths glimpsed by men of genius are ignored by their 
immediate descendants. In conclusion, Duhem says in 1894, “the scientist will not 
find [at the Egyptians and the Greeks] a continuous evolution and a logical 
concatenation of the professed doctrines;” or, as in the history of science it is only 
this continuous and logical concatenation that interests us, one cannot speak about 
a history of physics prior to the 17th century. 
After having given in the first four months of 1903 a detailed study on the 
evolution of mechanics (L’évolution de la Mécanique), in which he faithfully 
follows the conception of all informed men of the time, namely that between 
Aristotle's unusable science and the geometricians of the 17th century, when 
“sciences are reborn,” there is only the ‘old scholasticism,’ in its turn unusable,12 
Duhem begins to publish in quarterly series in the Revue des questions 
scientifiques, starting with October, a long study on the origins of statics. Bound 
together, these installments will become after two years the book Les Origines de 
la Statique (2 volumes, 1905; 1906).13 The installments had to appear regularly – in 
January, April, July and October of each year. 
For Duhem, at that time already an experienced historian of science, the 
subject under study did not present any particular problems. Everything was 
predictable. Counting on Duhem's proverbial conscientiousness, the editor 
expected an unabated delivery. The first installment appears in the October 1903 
issue, where Duhem writes that 
                                                                
10 R. N. D. Martin, “Duhem and the Origins of Statics: Ramifications of the Crisis of 1903-04,” 
Synthese 83, 3 (1990): 342.  
11 Pierre Duhem, “Les Théories de l’Optique,” Revue des deux mondes CXXIII (1894): 94-125.  
12 Pierre Duhem, L’évolution de la mécanique (Paris: Librairie Scientifique A. Hermann, 1905), 
13; L’évolution de la mécanique consists of articles published between January 30 and April 30, 
1903, in the Revue générale des Sciences. After a very general overview of the ‘peripatetician 
mechanics’ (Chap. I), in which Duhem illustrates the manner of explanation of natural 
phenomena in Aristotelian physics, the second chapter begins abruptly with this statement: „La 
renaissance des sciences au début du XVIIe siècle fut une réaction violente contre des semblables 
explications.” 
13 Pierre Duhem, Les Origines de la Statique (Paris: Librairie Scientifique Hermann, 1905-1906). 
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Les commentaires des Scolastiques touchant les Méchanika Problèmata d’Aristote 
n’ajoutèrent rien d’essentiel aux idées du Stagirite; pour voir ces idées pousser de 
nouveaux surgeons et donner de nouveaux fruits, il nous faut attendre le début 
du XVIe siècle.14 
The first four chapters of the first volume (all published in the October 1903 
installment) pass from Aristotle to Leonardo and Cardan, without the Middle Ages 
being even mentioned. But for the January issue – surprise! – Duhem does not 
send the following chapters. He apologized to Father Julien Thirion, his editor, 
saying that there have appeared a number of supplementary readings which he 
had not taken into account in the original plan of the work.15 Chapter 5, which 
appears in the Revue des questions scientifiques in the April 1904 issue and which 
should have continued with the contributions in statics after Cardan (16th 
century), makes a sudden return (back until the 13th century). Perfectly illogical to 
the original plan, which did not even mention the contributions of the Middle 
Ages to the science of statics, Duhem informs us that, before studying ‘the 
fundamental treatise of Statics’ produced by the ‘enigmatic’ Jordanus Nemorarius, 
there should be collected the ‘debris’ on this subject, scattered throughout the 
manuscripts left by the school of Alexandria.16 Chapters 5-9 are studying what the 
Alexandrians have received from the school of Nemorarius, subsequently detailing 
the contributions of this school to the development of statics. Only Chapter 10 
resumes the line interrupted at the end of Volume I, i.e. in the middle of the 16th 
century, with Guido Ubaldi and Benedetti. Tartaglia’s name, which now appears 
for the first time (as expressly stated in the preface to Volume I, from 21 March 
1905, written after the discovery of the statics of the Middle Ages), referred to as a 
plagiarist of Nemorarius, is mentioned for the merit of having broadcast in the 
middle of the 16th century some contributions of the 13th which otherwise would 
have remained completely ignored. 
In conclusion, although the reference to Nemorarius was not unknown to 
some historians of the Middle Ages,17 Duhem was the only historian of science to 
                                                                
14 Duhem, Les Origines de la Statique I, 13. 
15 R. N. D. Martin, “The Genesis of a Mediaeval Historian: Pierre Duhem and the Origins of 
Statics,” Annals of Science XXXIII (1976): 121.  
16 Duhem, Les Origines de la Statique I, 62.   
17 Even though Jordanus Nemorarius remains unknown to the historians of physics (to Lagrange, 
to Mach, to Wohlwill), the historians of mathematics do mention him: Montucla and Chasles 
(cf. Martin, “The Genesis of a Mediaeval Historian,” 123; Anastasios Brenner, Duhem: Science, 
réalité et apparence. La relation entre philosophie et histoire dans l’oeuvre de Pierre Duhem 
(Paris: Vrin, 1990), 145, note 3). Moreover, Bosmans knew the two treatises De ponderibus in 
question and anticipated that Duhem would come upon them (see Jaki, Uneasy Genius, 385), all 
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follow the thread of quotes on this author – referring to the original manuscripts 
and revealing texts which everyone had forgotten (but which the ‘inventors’ of 
modern science in the 17th century still knew very well) –, the only one who 
knew how to historically and epistemologically evaluate the things he had 
discovered. The result of this work was the discovery of the vast medieval 
discussions about the principle of virtual velocities,18 with which the great sunken 
continent of medieval physics began to regain the attention of scholars: first by 
the discovery that the principle of virtual velocities had also been known to the 
medieval scholars, as a principle of the demonstration of the static equilibria, and 
then by other findings, suggesting that the scholasticism of the 14th century had 
developed a dynamics completely different from the Aristotelian one. This 
extraordinary event – the beginning of the discovery of the physics of the Middle 
Ages – can be located between the summer and winter of 1903 (as the reference to 
Tartaglia appears only in the April 1904 installment).19 
The discovery of the physics of the Middle Ages was a surprise first of all for 
Duhem. He did not make this discovery because he was Catholic (as it was said, 
trying to reduce his discovery to an apologetic enterprise),20 but because, against 
                                                                                                                                       
the discussion with Father Thirion, sometime after October 1903, which Bosmans remembers in 
the evocation of Duhem (Henri S.J Bosmans, “Pierre Duhem: Notice sur ses travaux relatifs à 
l’histoire des sciences,” Revue des questions scientifiques 80, 30 (1921): 41).  
18 Stanley L. Jaki, “Foreword,” in Pierre Duhem, Medieval Cosmology. Theories of Infinity, 
Place, Time, Void, and the Plurality of Worlds, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), xv.  
19 Martin dates the great discovery at the end of the autumn of 1903 (Martin, “The Genesis of a 
Mediaeval Historian,” 120). 
20 See, for example, Guy Beaujouan, „Alexandre Koyré, l’évêque Tempier et les censures de 
1277,” in Science: The Renaissance of a History: Proceedings of the International Conference 
Alexandre Koyré, Paris, Collège de France, 10-14 June 1986, ed. Pietro Redondi, History and 
Technology 4, Special Issue (1987): 425:  
Vous savez tous comment, du fait de sa propre carrière scientifique et de son 
catholicisme militant, Pierre Duhem était idéologiquement conditionné à vouloir 
chercher dans la scolastique chrétienne les antécédents préparant l’éclosion de la 
science moderne du XVIIe siècle. 
Beaujouan's statement is factually false, as demonstrated in R.N.D. Martin, Pierre Duhem. 
Philosophy and History in the Work of a Believing Physicist (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: 
Open Court, 1991), passim. As shown in the famous letter to Father Bulliot dated May 21, 1911, 
Duhem does not make apologetics with his discoveries: he asks the Catholics to understand that 
the facts he discovered prove that the anti-Catholic and anti-Christian theses regarding the 
Middle Ages are false, factually false (the text of the letter may be found in Hélène Pierre-
Duhem, Un Savant Français: Pierre Duhem (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1936), 158-169); closer to our 
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his first convictions regarding the scientific nullity of the Middle Ages, Duhem 
behaved like a true conscientious and honest scientist: faced with the existence of 
new facts, he has granted them priority to his preconceptions and revised his 
initial theories.21 His remaining life (1903 to 1916) was dedicated by Duhem to the 
deepening of this epochal discoveries. There have resulted out of this concern two 
monumental works: Études sur Léonard de Vinci (3 volumes, 1906, 1909, 1913) 
and Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à 
Copernic (10 volumes, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1954, 1956, 1958, 1959). Le 
système du monde should have had twelve volumes and a summary of three 
hundred pages, which to synthetically rebuild the argument of the entire series. 
The last two volumes and the summary have not been written, and the tenth 
volume remained unfinished. Duhem died suddenly of a heart attack on 
September 14, 1916. He was only 55 years old.   
The studies on Leonardo da Vinci were occasioned by the publication of his 
notebooks and are devoted to the assessment of his scientific thought's sources, as 
well as of the impact his theories had on the development of the modern science 
of nature. The first two volumes bear the subtitle Ceux qu’il a lus et ceux qui l’ont 
lu  (written between 1905-1906 and 1907-1908, respectively), while the third and 
most voluminous (written between 1909-1912) is subtitled “Les précurseurs 
parisiens de Galilée” and is preceded by a preface which has the force of a 
manifesto:    
La science mécanique inaugurée par Galilée, par ses émules, par ses disciples, les 
Baliani, les Torricelli, les Descartes, les Beeckman, les Gassendi, n’est pas une 
création; l’intelligence moderne ne l’a pas produite de prime saut et de toutes 
pièces dès que la lecture d’Archimède lui eut révélé l’art d’appliquer la Géométrie 
aux effets naturels. L’habileté mathématique acquise dans le commerce des 
géomètres de l’Antiquité, Galilée et ses contemporains en ont usé pour préciser et 
développer une Science mécanique dont le Moyen-Âge chrétien avait posé les 
principes et formulé les propositions les plus essentielles. Cette Mécanique, les 
                                                                                                                                       
times, it has been reproduced in Jaki, Pierre Duhem, 235-239 (Nr. 15: “Deux chaires catholiques 
pour les sciences”). 
21 As a faithful of the Roman Catholic Church, perhaps Duhem would have liked to believe that 
the church has stimulated the free research, but before the annus mirabilis 1903 he did not have 
evidence that this would have happened. Therefore, as a good scientist, he allowed the Christian 
in himself only the exercise of faith, accepting as factum only what historical knowledge 
allowed him to accept as philosophical truth. Thus, he stated in his studies prior to the discovery 
of the physics of the Middle Ages exactly the opposite of what he would have perhaps liked to 
believe, namely that the period of maximum social development of Christianity was also an era 
of total scientific sterility. Therefore the discovery of the physics of the Middle Ages was not an 
apologist's work.   
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physiciens qui enseignaient, au XIVe siècle, à l’Université de Paris l’avaient 
substitué à la Dynamique d’Aristote […]. Au temps de la Renaissance, l’archaïsme 
superstitieux, où se complaisaient également le bel esprit des Humanistes et la 
routine averroïste d’une Scolastique rétrograde, repoussa cette doctrine des 
‘Modernes.’ […] Mais à la suite des condamnations portées, en 1277, par l’évêque 
de Paris, Étienne Tempier, contre une foule de thèses que soutenaient ‘Aristote et 
ceux de sa suite,’ voici qu’un grand nombre se dessine, qui va libérer la pensée 
chrétienne du joug du Péripatétisme et du Néoplatonisme, et produire ce que 
l’archaïsme de la Renaissance appellera la Science des ‘Modernes.’ […] Cette 
Mécanique, à la fois céleste et terrestre, à laquelle Newton devait donner la forme 
que nous admirons aujourd’hui, la voici, d’ailleurs, qui, dès le XIVe siècle, tente 
de se constituer. […] Cette substitution de la Physique moderne à la Physique 
d’Aristote a résulté d’un effort de longue durée et d’extraordinaire puissance. […] 
Jusqu’à ces dernières années, la Science du Moyen-Âge était tenue pour 
inexistante.22  
When he was writing these lines, on the 24th of May 1913, the first volume 
of Le Système du Monde had already appeared, and the next four volumes were 
probably already drafted23. This history of cosmological doctrines from Plato to 
Copernicus, the crowning and final mark of the discovery from the autumn of 
1903, was designed to completely change the fate of specialized historical 
scholarship, creating a new academic discipline and setting in a sustainable and 
authoritative manner its further developmental milestones.24 In these volumes 
                                                                
22 Pierre Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci. Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée, troisième 
série, 1913. (Montreux: éditions des archives contemporaines, 1984), v, vii, x, xiii. 
23 Martin, Pierre Duhem, 10.  
24 John E. Murdoch, a very severe critic of Duhem's thesis, acknowledges in the conclusion of an 
article dedicated to his contribution to the history of medieval science that  
Duhem has to a great extent set the topics for subsequent historians of late 
medieval science. Not only have earlier investigators, like Dijksterhuis and 
Michalski, followed Duhem’s scenario, but the same has been true to a large 
extent in the case of others who have addressed the history of fourteenth-
century science in general, such as Maier and Clagett. Duhem’s influence in this 
regard is, moreover, no less evident among historians of medieval philosophy 
than among historians of medieval science. [...] In conclusion, then, when Dana 
Durand claimed that all future historians would spend most of their time 
‘working intensively the veins’ Duhem had opened, he did not sufficiently 
appreciate that the lode ran well beyond the history of medieval science and 
penetrated well into the terrain of late medieval philosophy. And all that in spite 
of the continued successful criticism of the yield Duhem had derived from it.  
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there are comprised in their most elaborate form all the findings and 
interpretations which, put together, we could call the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis.’25 I 
claim that there is an argument which encompasses all of Pierre Duhem's 
discoveries regarding the history of science and that this argument can be 
synthesized as a combination of several principles, sentences and conjectures 
forming a whole which I call the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis.’ 
3. 
What is, then, the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’? Most generally, the ‘Pierre Duhem 
Thesis’ states that the Latin Middle Ages had a significant and important (even 
decisive) contribution to the gradual progress of science, from Antiquity until the 
17th  century. Analyzed in its particular statements, the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ can 
be summed up by stating several sub-theses: 
(i) The sub-thesis ‘The Theological Revolution.’26 In the preface to the third 
part of Le Système du monde, significantly entitled “Le péripatétisme, les religions 
et la science d’observation,”27 Duhem advances the argument that Greek science 
was prevented from developing and evolving beyond a certain threshold (where it 
was blockaded) by its philosophical and religious premises, which were neo-
platonic and ‘astro-biological’ (the divine nature of stars, the animation of matter, 
                                                                                                                                       
(Murdoch, “Pierre Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science,” 299; 301-302). See also 
Dana B. Durand, “Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Origins of Modern Science,” Speculum 16, 2 
(1941): 167-185. 
25 What I call here the ‘Duhem Thesis’ has nothing to do with the ‘Quine-Duhem thesis’ 
(sometimes called the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis,’ the ‘Duhem thesis,’ or the ‘D-Thesis’); the ‘Duhem 
Thesis’ I refer to is deducted directly from his writings and is not assigned to him par méprise, 
such as the ‘Quine-Duhem thesis,’ which, as demonstrated by Robert Ariew, is not related with 
what Duhem himself advocated (cf. Roger Ariew, “The Duhem Thesis,” British Journal of the 
Philosophy of Science 35 (1984): 313-325).   
26 Curiously enough, the notion of the ‘Theological Revolution,’ although central in Duhem's 
argument, has never been analyzed in the specialized literature. 
27 The subject is treated in Pierre Duhem, Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines 
cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, tome IV, 1916, Nouveau tirage (Paris: Hermann, 1973), 
309-320 (“La crue de l’aristotélisme,” “Avant-propos,” “Le péripatétisme, les religions et la 
science d’observation”). Anastasios Brenner underlines the importance of this section by fully 
reproducing it in Pierre Duhem, L’aube du savoir. Épitomé du Système du Monde. Histoire des 
doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, ed. Anastasios Brenner (Paris: Hermann, Éditeurs 
des sciences et des arts, 1997), 225-236 (with a small omission: compare Duhem, Le Système du 
Monde IV, 314 to Duhem, L’aube du savoir, 230).  
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etc.).28 This blockage could only be overcome by ensuring a ‘theological 
revolution’ as a precondition for the adoption of the Copernican theory; through 
the ‘theological revolution’ applied to the mind, the scientific mind was freed 
from the ontological premises of Neoplatonism and astrobiology, which allowed 
its opening to an ontological perspective compatible with the data of existence of 
the modern science of nature.29  
A similar argument is to be found in the second part of Le Système du 
Monde, which is entitled “L'Astronomie latine au Moyen Âge” and begins with a 
section called “Les Pères de l'Église et la science profane.”30 Duhem brings into 
attention that, although it is not possible to find in the works of the Church 
Fathers scientific contributions comparable to those of the Greek science, their 
views should not be ignored because  
their teachings in Physics and Astronomy are the primal germs out of which 
medieval Christian cosmology will slowly and gradually develop.31  
The Church Fathers attacked from the perspective of Christian theology the 
principles of Greek science which happened to be exactly those which, according 
to Paul Tannery,32 contributed the most to stop the progress of ancient science and 
exhausted its fertility: the principle of the eternity of prime matter, the faith in the 
domination of stars over sublunary life, and the temporal cyclicity of the world. 
Duhem's conclusion is:  
En ruinant, par ses attaques, les Cosmologies du Péripatétisme, du Stoïcisme et du 
Néo-Platonisme, les Pères de l’Église font place nette à la Science moderne.33  
And here, even though he does not explicitly use the formula of ‘theological 
revolution,’ one still basically speaks of a ‘theological revolution,’ understood by 
Duhem, like in the first case, as a prior mental framework able to make possible 
‘the reason of the believer’34 – that is, the reason which, thus positioned, could 
modern-physically think of nature.   
                                                                
28 The term ‘astrobiology’ was coined by René Berthelot, La pensée de l'Asie et l'astrobiologie 
(Paris: Payot,  1938).  
29 Duhem, Le Système du Monde IV, 316-317. 
30 Pierre Duhem, Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à 
Copernic, tome II, 1914, Nouveau tirage (Paris: Hermann, 1984), 392-408; Duhem, L’aube du 
savoir, 125-138.  
31 Duhem, Le Système du Monde II, 407-408; Duhem, L’aube du savoir, 138. 
32 Paul Tannery, Recherches sur l’histoire de l’Astronomie ancienne (Paris: Gauthier-Villars & 
Fils, 1983), 280-281. 
33 Duhem, Le Système du Monde II, 408; Duhem, L’aube du savoir, 138. 
34 Duhem, Le Système du Monde II, 315; Duhem, L’aube du savoir, 231. 
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(ii) The sub-thesis ‘The Condemnation of 1277.’ Although medieval 
Aristotelianism was important for the maturation and professionalization of 
reflection in natural philosophy, the release from its philosophical premises was 
the second fundamental precondition for the further development of science 
beyond the achievements of ancient science. The second precondition was 
realized by what we could conventionally call ‘the Condemnation of 1277,’ by 
which the medieval mind was compelled by the exigencies of the Christian faith 
to think the natural world starting not from the Greek (Aristotelian) 
necessitarianism, as did the 13th-century scholasticism, but from the absolute 
power of God (potentia Dei absoluta). The spirit of the Condemnation is illustrated 
by Article 147, which condemns the opinion that it is impossible for God 
something suitable for nature (where the impossible did not designate the logical 
impossible, which was accepted, but the natural one, which was rejected). This 
mode of vision removed the Aristotelian obstacles in the conception of nature and 
in the discourse about it (it was only thus that one could admit the plurality of 
worlds and the existence of vacuum, which nature such as Aristotelianism 
understood it rejected as impossible), and favored the thought regarding the 
counterfactuals by the appearance and generalization of the ratiocination by 
‘thought experiments’ (Gedankenexperimente).35 For this reason, according with 
Duhem, the Condemnation of 1277 are one of the possible points that might date 
the ‘birth’ of the modern science of nature.36 
(iii) The sub-thesis ‘The Continuity.’ After having discovered the statics of 
the Middle Ages (annus mirabillis 1903), Duhem has become convinced that not 
only the selection of the hypotheses on which physical theory is built is subjected 
to a principle of continuity (1893),37 but also the history of science follows this 
principle, according to the historical observation that science progresses gradually 
and continuously, without rupture or revolution:  
                                                                
35 Edward Grant, „The Effect of the Condemnation of 1277,” in The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Desintegration of Scholasticism 
1100-1600, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Antony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 537-539. 
36 Pierre Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci. Ceux qu’il a lus et ceux qui l’ont lu, deuxième 
série, 1909 (Montreux: éditions des archives contemporaines, 1984), 408-423; Duhem, Études 
sur Léonard de Vinci. Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée, vii; the complete discussion of the 
Condemnation's consequences is in Pierre Duhem, Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines 
cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, tome VI, Nouveau tirage (Paris: Hermann, 1984), passim.    
37 Pierre Duhem, “L’école anglaise et les théories physiques,” Revue des Questions Scientifiques 
34 (1983): 345-378. Reprinted in Pierre Duhem, Prémices philosophiques, ed. Stanley L. Jaki 
(Leiden, New York etc.: E.J. Brill, 1987), 113-146. 
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La science mécanique et physique dont s’enorgueillissent à bon droit les temps 
modernes découle, par une suite ininterrompue de perfectionnements à peine 
sensibles, des doctrines professées au sein des écoles du moyen âge ; les 
prétendues révolutions intellectuelles n’ont été, le plus souvent, que des 
évolutions lentes et longuement préparées ; les soi-disant renaissances que des 
réactions fréquemment injustes et stériles ; le respect de la tradition est une 
condition essentielle du progrès scientifique.38 
The sub-thesis of the continuity has therefore a double aspect: an 
epistemological one, when it is applied to science; a historical one, when it is 
applied to the history of science. 
(iv) The sub-thesis ‘Galileo’s forerrunners of the 14th century’ (or ‘Duhem's 
canonical list’). Within the overall framework of the thesis of continuity, Duhem 
argues the exceptional importance of the contributions belonging to the 
scholastics of the 14th century, primarily those who taught at the University of 
Paris (Jean Buridan, Nicole Oresme, Albert de Saxonie, Themon Judaeus, Marsilius 
din Inghen), and then of those who were associated with Merton College, Oxford 
(Thomas Bradwardine, Roger Swineshead, William Heytesbury, Richard 
Kilvington, John Dumbleton).39 These contributions form ‘Duhem's canonical list’ 
(or, as John E. Murdoch named it, ‘Duhem’s canonic roster of fourteenth-century 
accomplishments’).40 The scientific achievements of the 14th  century, which 
                                                                
38 Duhem, Les Origines de la Statique I, iv (the Preface is dated  March 21, 1905).   
39 The different appraisals of the two schools, the Paris and the Oxonian ones, have two 
explanations: firstly, a sort of anti-English preconception and a French nationalism, argued by 
the taste for the elegant  ratiocination (l'esprit de finesse) and the repulsion for (the excess of) 
logicism; secondly, there is an epistemological limit of understanding (see Murdoch, “Pierre 
Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science,” 262-270): according to Murdoch, Duhem did 
not understand the exceptional epistemological value of the ‘sophismata’ exercises, which he 
treated as “cette acrobatie logique [qui] était le sport en vogue à l’École d’Oxford” (Pierre 
Duhem, Le Système du Monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic, tome 
VII (Paris: Hermann, 1956),  619): the type of ratiocination developed and refined in order to 
solve the sophismata, named by Murdoch ‘secundum imaginationem reasoning,’ was in his 
opinion the fundamental scientific novelty of the 14th century, a fact completely unnoticed by 
Duhem (Murdoch, 291-292). Murdoch quotes two important authors to support his point of 
view (Murdoch, 294, note 192): „Man möchtet beinahe sagen: Bradwardine wollte die Principia 
mathematica philosophie naturalis seines Jahrhunderts schreiben” (Anneliese Maier, Die 
Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik, Band I 
(Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1949), 86, note 10); „[Bradwardine’s Tractatus de 
proportionibus] should be seen as at least a partial attempt to create a new mathematical science 
of motion” (Andrew George Molland, „Medieval Ideas of Scientific Progress,” Journal of History 
of Ideas 39 (1978):  572).     
40 Murdoch, “Pierre Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science,” 258.  
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according to Duhem show the debt of Galileo and Descartes to the physics of the 
Middle Ages, would run as it  follows (I pursue the list established by Murdoch): 
the correct explanation of the reason for which the motion of a projectile 
continues after he is not moved by an agent; the correct explanation of the 
uniformly accelerated motion in free fall; the development of the theory regarding 
the ‘latitude of forms;’ the postulation of the possibility of  existence of infinite 
and infinitesimal quantities, of space vacuum, of the rotation of the earth, and of 
the plurality of worlds; the crystallization of new and clear concepts of motion, 
place and time, which were non-Aristotelian. 
(v) The sub-thesis ‘The Domingo de Soto connection.’ Duhem discovered, in 
a treatise on Aristotle's physics written by Domingo de Soto and published in 
1545, that in the scholastic tradition to which the author pertained the following 
theorems were well known: the free fall of bodies is a motion accelerated with 
respect to time; the motion of a body thrown vertically upwards is uniformly 
slowed; in order to calculate the space covered in both movements, one must 
apply the demonstrations developed by Nicole Oresme for the uniformiter 
difformis movement (or, which is the same thing, the mean speed theorem 
developed by the Mertonians).41 “Ces lois, d’ailleurs,” says Duhem,  
il n’en revendique pas l’invention; bien plutôt, il semble les donner comme 
vérités communément reçues; sans doute, elles étaient couramment admises par 
les maîtres dont, à Paris, Soto a suivi les leçons. Ainsi, de Guillaume d’Ockam à 
Dominique Soto, voyons-nous les physiciens de l’École parisienne poser tous les 
fondements de la Mécanique que développeront Galilée, ses contemporains et ses 
disciples.42  
Historiography took on this thesis of Duhem under the form of two 
research programs designed to solve the ‘two de Soto enigmas.’ Koyré is the first 
who, in an article in the late 50s, referred to this Duhem thesis as the ‘enigma of 
Domingo de Soto.’  Here we have it in his wording:  
[h]ow did [Domingo de] Soto arrive to give the movement of falling as an 
example of uniformly accelerated motion and even to describe as something self-
understood this transposition of a purely mathematical conception into physical 
reality, although the mathematicians and logicians of the schools in Paris and 
Oxford have not realized this transposition?43  
                                                                
41 Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci. Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée, 555-562. Duhem 
only refers to Oresme (561) and mentions Bradwardine in passing (557).   
42 Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci. Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée, xi.   
43 Alexandre Koyré, “Fizica,” in Istoria generală a științei, vol. II, ed. René Taton (București: 
Editura Științifică, 1971), 106. Koyré's question departs from the assumption that Sotto, while 
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The second ‘de Soto enigma’ is whether and how Galileo came to know 
Domingo de Sotoʹs theorems (Duhem's conjecture being that the missing link 
between Galileo and the 14th-century physics is Domingo de Soto).44 The answer 
to the second enigma and the acceptance of the truth of the three theorems 
attributed by Duhem to Domingo de Soto represent the ‘Domingo de Soto 
connection.’ 
4. 
While contemplating the nature of the five special sub-theses which compose 
together the general ‘Duhem Thesis,’ two implicit observations emerge. 
The first observation is that, in relation to what we now call “the birth of 
the modern science of nature in the 17th century,” sub-theses (i) and (ii) are of 
one type, while sub-theses (iv) and (v) are of another. The former have the 
structure of transcendental reasoning, which has the form: “in order for ‘X’ to be 
possible, the {yn} conditions must take place;” the latter have the structure of 
causal reasoning, having the form: “the existence of ‘Y’ produces the existence of 
‘X.’” Neither the ‘theological revolution,’ nor the ‘Condemnation of 1277’ do not 
represent effective causes of the emergence of the modern science of nature. We 
could call them transcendental ‘conditionalities,’ in order to decidedly distinguish 
them from the effective causes, which alone are ‘causal.’ The  transcendental 
‘conditionalities’ create the framework which makes possible, under certain 
conditions, the appearance of something, but do not necessarily or directly actuate 
its appearance. To make possible does not effectively mean to be a cause, but 
rather to open a field of possibilities. If this ‘field of possibilities’ is not opened, the 
occurrence of the causes which could theoretically be effective remains without 
effect. The effectiveness of the effective causes is conditioned by the existence of a 
‘field of possibilities;’ and the ‘field of possibilities’ is opened only by the activation 
of some  transcendental ‘conditionalities.’ 
The second observation is that the two aspects of sub-thesis (iii) (‘the thesis 
of continuity’), the epistemological-methodological and the historical one, are 
fundamentally inseparable. On the one hand, the thesis of continuity is a 
                                                                                                                                       
not being ‘a great philosopher’ and his physics being ‘traditional and eclectic,’ surprisingly fell 
on an innovative and correct solution to the problem of falling and vertical projection of bodies; 
in the same time, Koyré wondered, “how come that from him to Galilei [Sotto's solution] was 
not adopted by anyone?” 
44 This second enigma was finally solved by William A. Wallace, who confirmed Duhem 
entirely (William A. Wallace, “The Enigma of Domingo de Soto: Uniformiter difformis and 
Falling Bodies in Late Medieval Physics,” Isis 59, 4 (1964): 384-401). 
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methodological principle of prescriptive nature, deeply rooted in Duhem's 
conception of physical theory:  
The thesis of historical continuity is one part of his epistemology with which 
Duhem attempts to resolve the problem of the choice of hypotheses.45  
The methodological principle of continuity saves from mutual incoherence 
the particular theories of physics and makes them advance in their historical 
evolution towards a ‘natural classification’ of things which will reflect the 
ontological truth of the final theory.46 It is exactly the methodological aspect of 
the thesis of historical continuity that makes Duhem's epistemology to be not 
conventionalist or instrumentalist, but realistic in a special way (‘convergent or 
motivational realism’).47 
On the other hand, when referring to the history of science, the thesis of 
continuity has a contingent aspect, as Ariew and Barker noticed: 
the thesis is most compelling as a contingent claim about history of science: 
continuity just happens to be the case; it could have been otherwise.48  
Indeed, Duhem reached the thesis of ‘continuity’ a posteriori, as a result of 
the discovery he had made, and not a priori, as a result of the identification of a 
                                                                
45 Roberto Maiocchi, “Pierre Duhem’s Aim and Structure of Physical Theory: A Book Against 
Conventionalism,” Synthese 83, 3 (1990): 395. Maiocchi's thesis on Duhem was extensively 
developed in his Chimica e filosofie. Scienza, epistemologia, storia e religione nell’ opera di 
Piere Duhem (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1985).  
46 Duhem, Prémices philosophiques, 132-138: at pp. 134-135, Duhem speaks of the fact that the 
methodological principle of continuity eliminates the incoherence of the theories based on 
irreconcilable hypotheses; and at pp. 136-138 he speaks of the natural classification and of the 
perfection of the ideal theory. For natural classification, see also: Pierre Duhem, La théorie 
physique: son objet, sa structure. Deuxième édition revue et augmentée (Paris: Librairie 
philosophique J. Vrin), 460. In recent literature, Sonia Maria Dion argued that  
[t]he association of natural classification to the thesis of historical continuity [is] 
an essential condition to the possibility of assigning a goal to the evolution of 
physical theory. 
(Sonia Maria Dion,. “Pierre Duhem and the Inconsistency Between Instrumentalism and 
Natural Classification,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013): 12–19).  
47 The phrase ‘motivational realism’ belongs to Karen Merikangas Darling (Karen Merikangas 
Darling, “Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem,” Philosophy of 
Science 70, 5 (2003): 1125–1136); see also Roger Ariew, “Pierre Duhem,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2014 Edition. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/duhem/, § 2.2.   
48 Roger Ariew and Peter Barker, “Duhem and Continuity in the History of Science,” Revue 
internationalle de philosophie 46, 182 (1992): 323. 
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philosophical principle that lies beyond experience and is independent of it. As 
such, from a historical perspective, we could say that the thesis of continuity does 
not function with Duhem as a philosophical or teleological principle, but as a 
description. 
At the same time, we must note that the methodological prescription 
imposed on particular theories in epistemology has necessary consequences on the 
evolution of theories towards a ‘natural classification’ (the final theory) in history. 
In fact, the proper functioning of epistemology creates a certain history and no 
other. That is why I said that the two aspects of sub-thesis (iii), the 
epistemological-methodological and the historical ones, are non-separable. And 
for this reason I think that the real challenge of the thesis of continuity 
formulated by Duhem is not in its understanding as a historical-contingent 
statement of the type “it may have also been different, even though it actually 
happened so” (the Ariew and Barker interpretation cited above), but as a strong 
statement of the type „it happened so, because it could only happen thus” (the Jaki 
thesis).49 Formulated briefly, the Duhem-Jaki thesis (as Eric V. Snow names it)50 
argues that “the world view of Christianity was absolutely necessary for the rise of 
modern science.”51  
 
                                                                
49 The main books in which Stanley L. Jaki dealt with the conditions necessary for the birth of 
the modern science of nature, analyzing both the situations when science could not appear, 
although its birth seemed imminent (what he calls ‘the 'stillbirth' of science’), as well as the 
situations when science could appear are: Science and Creation. From Eternal Cycles to an 
Oscillating Universe (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974); The Road of Science and the 
Ways to God. The Gifford Lectures 1975 and 1976 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 
Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1978); The Origin of Science and the Science of its Origins 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press; South Bend, Ind.: Gateway Editions, 1978); The Savior of 
Science (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988); Christ and Science (Royal Oak, Michigan: 
Real View Books, 2000). 
50 Eric V. Snow, „Christianity: A Cause of Modern Science?” Acts & Facts 27, 4 (1998). 
https://archive.org/details/IsChristianityACauseOfScienceTheDuhem-jakiAndMertonTheses 
Explained. Accessed on February 17, 2015.   
51 That does not mean, as François Mentré already warned shortly after the death of Duhem, 
that science is a ‘Christian product:’ “Duhem does not say that modern science is a product of 
Christianity; he rather says that Christianity has been an auxiliary, and an indispensable one, to 
the scientific development” (François Mentré, “Pierre Duhem: Historien et Philosophe,” Revue 
des Jeunes 15 (1917): 139, note). Stanley Jaki, who quotes this warning, wholly aproves it: “This 
is an all-important point, often forgotten in sympathetic portrayals of the role of Christianity in 
the rise of science” (Jaki, Uneasy Genius, 231-232, note 36).   
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5. 
These two observations allow us to more clearly evaluate the complex structure of 
what I call the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis.’ ‘The Duhem thesis’ is, in my opinion, the 
central argument of Pierre Duhem's work as historian of science. The ‘Pierre 
Duhem thesis’ can not be reduced to any of its sub-theses. The five sub-theses are 
not independent, they do not work separately and do not relate to reality 
separately (but only as a system). Their diverse theoretical status (some have a 
transcendental character, while some other causal, factual, or descriptive ones) 
makes the way in which they relate each and all together to historical reality to be 
particularly complex. Therefore, the factual assessment of the sub-theses, as well 
as the historical judgment on the value of the overall argument advanced by 
Duhem must, I think, be both balanced and prudent, and the identification of the 
direct causalities must always be combined with the understanding of the role of 
transcendental ‘conditionalities.’  
The distinction between transcendental ‘conditionalities’ and effective 
causes is essential to understand the finesse of Duhem's argument. For example, 
Duhem never claimed that the modern science of nature is due to the 
Condemnation of 1277.52 He referred to the Condemnation as to some  
transcendental ‘conditionalities’ which opened for the physics of the 14th century 
a ‘field of possibilities,’ just as the ‘Theological Revolution’ functioned, in relation 
to the ‘astrobiology’ of the Greeks, as an inhibitor of ontological representations, 
opening by these very inhibitions the horizon of some other representations, more 
capable than their antecessors to make system with principles favorable to the 
                                                                
52 This is how Alexandre Koyré chose to read Duhem's statements, and his interpretation 
became authoritative, y compris among the historians of the Middle Ages (even though he was 
not one): Alexandre Koyré, “Le Vide et l’espace infini au XIVe siècle,” Archives d’histoire 
doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge XVIII (1949), reprinted in Alexandre Koyré, Études 
d’histoire de la pensée philosophique (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 37-45); for the effect on the 
historians of the Middle Ages, see the influence of this article on Marshall Clagett: “I was […] 
impressed by his beautiful paper “Le Vide et l’espace infini au XIVe siècle,” and particularly by 
the doubt it cast on the easy generalizations of Pierre Duhem.” (“Commemoration,” Isis 57 
(1966), quoted in I. Bernard Cohen, „Alexandre Koyré in America: Some Personal 
Reminiscences,” in Science: The Renaissance of a History, ed. Redondi, 60) — Clagett was 
mainly impressed  by the way Koyré amended Duhem! It was precisely this malicious readings, 
which positively impressed Clagett, that the later historians of the Middle Ages would reveal as 
historically false (see Beaujouan, “Alexandre Koyré,” 425-429; and Edward Grant, “The 
Condemnation of 1277. God's Absolute Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages,” 
Viator 10 (1979): 211-244; for an overall assessment, see Edward Grant, The Foundations of 
Modern Science in the Middle Ages. Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 70-126).    
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development of a mathematical science of nature, overcoming thus the impasse of 
the Greek science. At the same time, the sub-thesis of continuity must be 
understood both in its double epistemological-normative and historical-
descriptive aspect (see discussion above), as well as in terms of the complex 
historical causalities: a fine interaction between transcendental ‘conditionalities’ 
and effective causes. 
Given the complexity of the historical argument formulated by Duhem 
(which I named the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’), the legacy of his findings was 
reportedly extremely complex. Duhem established a number of facts (the physics 
of the Middle Ages, the “canonical roster” etc.), proposed several causal links (the 
Domingo de Soto conjecture, implying the Collegio Romano connection etc.), 
argued some historical ‘conditionalities’ of transcendental type (the Theological 
Revolution, the Condemnation of 1277), and advanced the great historical 
hypothesis of continuity (the Parisian precursors of Galileo). 
Pierre Duhem's findings were epoch-making. They revealed a sunken and 
completely forgotten continent (the physics of the Middle Ages), put on the map 
the topic of the links between the modern and the medieval worlds (which 
seemed to be resolved by the extremist views of Petrarch in the 14th century and 
Voltaire in the 18th), restructured completely the contents of the history of 
science and of the history of medieval philosophy, and gave impetus to a deeper 
institutional transformation in the teaching of history and philosophy of science. 
But the fact that the physics of the Middle Ages existed, and that the emergence of 
the modern science of nature, whatever its relation to it, cannot be imagined 
without it, has remained what Jean-François Revel called ‘une connaissance 
inutile.’ By tracing the complex and complicated manner in which this formidable 
discovery was only partially integrated into the dominant historiography of 
science, and the failure of our general culture to integrate it one can understand 
that the reasons of this resistance to the ‘Pierre Duhem Thesis’ are deeply rooted 
into the moral and philosophical settings of our modern civilization. But this is a 
story to be told in another article.53, 54 
                                                                
53 See Horia-Roman Patapievici, “The Discovery of the Physics of the Middle Ages by Pierre 
Duhem. The Fate and Meaning of a Truth,” forthcoming in Meaning and Truth, eds. Sorin 
Costreie and Mircea Dumitru (București: Pro Universitaria, 2015).  
54 This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources 
Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian 
Government under the contract number POSDRU 159/1.5/S/133675. 
